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European Climate Change Policy in a Global Context  
Michael Grubb 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the evolution and state of 
policy towards climate change in the European Union (EU), to assess 
prospects for the EU meeting its carbon dioxide CO2 emission target, 
and to consider future options for EU climate policy and their 
international implications. Because detailed accounts of the science are 
available elsewhere, for this paper it is sufficient to say that, although 
there have been significant advances in aspects of our scientific 
understanding, for policy purposes we remain uncertain but 
concerned:  
 
· uncertain because, although the science is beyond dispute at the 
most fundamental level (i.e. that greenhouse gases such as CO2 act to 
warm the earth's surface and that human emissions are increasing 
their concentration), we do not understand adequately the various 
positive and negative feedbacks associated with the water cycle, and 
longer-term responses associated with natural carbon and methane 
cycles; nor do we understand the critically important issue of ocean-
current behaviour; 
· concerned because we know that CO2 and (to a lesser extent) other 
greenhouse gas emissions are making a large perturbation to the 
natural balance of flows of greenhouse gases and that this must 
ultimately affect climatic patterns and possibly the ocean-current 
flows that we believe have been implicated in past climatic 
instabilities. 
 
Since concerns about human-induced climatic change first emerged as 
a major political issue in the mid- to late 1980s, governments in the 
European Union and Scandinavia have been in the forefront of efforts 
to start addressing the problem. Some EU countries, and later the EU 
itself, adopted unilateral emission goals and sought to follow these 
through with policies to limit particularly CO2 emissions. Building upon 
this, the EU sought to lead the international process established by the 
UN General Assembly towards a strong Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. 
 The Convention which emerged from this process, signed by 153 
countries at the UN Conference on Environment and Development at 
Rio in June 1992 (and by several more since), now forms the legal basis 
for the international development of responses to the climate problem.  
International Importance of EU Climate Strategy 
EU Emissions in the International Context 
Figure 1 shows the contribution of different regions to fossil-fuel CO2 
emissions in 1993, in terms of emissions per capita compared against 
population (the product—the area of the blocks—is thus proportional 
to total emissions). The USA was the biggest emitter, accounting for 25 
per cent of the global total; the countries of Central/East Europe, 
including Russia, in total accounted for another 17 per cent, but 
following the breakup and economic contraction of this region, the EC 
is left as the second-biggest cohesive economic group, emitting 14.5 
per cent of global CO2 emissions (the accession of Austria and 
Scandinavian countries will add another per cent or so). Emissions from 
developing countries are rising rapidly, and now account for over a 
quarter of the global total.  
 On a per-capita basis, the USA is again the most profligate emitter 
and forms a distinct group along with Canada and Australia; European 
per-capita emissions are in a range similar to Japan and (now) to the 
former USSR, at about half this level. On this measure there is a big gulf 
compared with most developing countries, where emissions per capita 
are typically several times lower than in developed countries.  
 Because of this and differences in wealth, and the fact that the 
developed countries have dominated emissions historically, 
developing countries have taken the attitude that stabilization of 
emissions from industrialized countries is a precondition for them to 
consider any substantive abatement action. The economic collapse of 
the former Soviet Union means that emissions are contracting there 
anyway, and precludes them from taking a more active position. The 
focus is thus upon OECD countries.  
 The US Clinton Administration published its national 
strategy for 1990–2000 stabilization1 of greenhouse gases 
relatively early, as did the United Kingdom. Japan has 
committed to a target of per-capita 1990–2000 CO2 
 stabilization, published an Action Plan to Arrest Global 
Warming, and is working on more detailed measures. 
Japan has also emphasized the long-term nature of the problem, 
and technological strategies towards this long term. Action 
in all three of the OECD's major economic groupings is 
important, but there is a particularly strong spotlight upon 
Europe, which led the declarations of emissions stabilization
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Fig. 1. Carbon emissions per capita and population, 1993 
(Source: Derived by the author from BP Statistical Review of World Energy (1994) and World Population Prospects, UN). 
 
 
 but which has yet to agree on any coherent strategy for achieving it.  
 
Internal Differences: The EU as a ‘Test Case’ and 
Nucleus 
Another reason why the EU position is important is because in several 
ways the EU represents a microcosm of the global problem. EU member 
countries vary with respect to economic and institutional factors, and 
some of the problems faced by the EU reflect those that could arise, on 
a larger scale, at the global level in the negotiation of a co-ordinated 
climate change strategy. There is a ‘North–South’ dimension, with four 
countries in a markedly less advanced development stage; Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland, and Greece. Their relatively homogeneous economic 
situation is the basis for their common position on some aspects of 
climate change policy: these ‘cohesion countries’ do not want to bear 
the responsibility for past emissions of other EU countries, and they 
fear any constraint on energy consumption as an obstacle to the main 
aim of economic growth. Moreover, the economic costs of limiting 
emissions to 1990 levels would be higher for the currently less-
developed countries as their economies are likely to grow faster, and 
start from a lower basis. Climate policy declarations in the EU have 
recognized the disparity, and that emissions from these countries are 
likely to grow in the context of overall stabilization, requiring reductions 
from some other member states.  
 Beside the decision on the extent of action, economic factors also 
 
affect the choice of policy instruments. The same strategy will have 
different costs for different countries depending on the economic 
structure, existing taxation (average fossil-fuel prices in EU countries 
vary mainly because of differing taxes), and resource availability. For 
example, in the discussion on the carbon tax, the size of the nuclear 
contribution in France has motivated support for a tax entirely based on 
the carbon content of fuels rather than on a mix of carbon and energy; 
the opposite is true for Germany. Also, similar instruments would not be 
equally easy or efficient in all countries, given their differing political, 
cultural, and economic situations.  
 Political and institutional variations include the general national 
approach to policy-making; specific elements that influence the 
position on the particular climate change issue; and the state of the 
debate on sovereignty, subsidiarity, and the strength of EU decision-
making powers. Wynne2 draws a distinction between a ‘top-down’ 
approach centred on formal policy institutions (e.g. the Netherlands, 
Germany), and a ‘bottom-up’ approach (e.g. the United Kingdom) in 
which diverse actors other than the formal institutions play an 
important role in policy development and implementation, rather than 
simply adapting to it. Acceptance of policies can also be influenced by 
other developments; for example, the United Kingdom population is 
most unlikely to accept additional energy taxation just after the 
government has fought to introduce VAT on domestic energy 
consumption.  
 All these differences complicate the process of achieving agreement 
among EU countries, but they are small compared 
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with the differences that exist at the global level. Compared with the 
differences between the USA, Russia, and China, for example, the EU is 
quite a homogeneous group, with strong co-ordinating institutions 
already in place. If concrete international action to counteract global 
warming has any chance of being taken in the near future, it will be 
easier for a small group of relatively homogeneous countries such as 
EU member states to take the lead. Such action may also demonstrate 
possible avenues for implementing agreements between states with 
different economic conditions, cultures, and sensitivities. The 
demonstration effect of EU policy may thus strongly influence the 
approach taken at the global level. Furthermore, there exist various 
ways in which an initial coalition—such as the EU—may itself form a 
nucleus for an expanding regime, over and above the fact and impact of 
political leadership.3 Hence the importance of EU climate policy for the 
world. 
 
The Development of EU Climate Policy4 
The EU CO2 Stabilization Declaration 
The European Community has taken a forward stance on the issue of 
climate change, and CO2 emissions in particular. EC member countries 
were amongst the first to adopt targets for limiting CO2 emissions, and 
to urge the international community to negotiate a binding Convention 
including emission constraints. The decision with the single greatest 
impact on the development of the issue, both within the EC and on the 
broader international discussions, was the declaration by the joint 
Council of EC Energy and Environment Ministers of Member States, 
on 29 October 1990, that: ‘The European Community and Member 
States assume that other leading countries undertake commitments 
along [similar] lines and, acknowledging the targets identified by a 
number of Member States  .  .  .  are willing to take actions aiming at 
reaching stabilization of the total CO2 emissions by 2000 at 1990 level in 
the Community as a whole.’ 
 This falls into the pattern of ‘constructively ambiguous’ declarations 
that mark many stages of the development of climate policy, most 
notably the Convention itself; it expresses ‘willingness to take action 
aiming at  .  .  .’, and ‘assumes’ that other countries will take similar 
measures, but does not make the goal explicitly conditional upon such 
action. The UN Climate Convention, which the European Union signed 
some twenty months later at Rio, reiterates this ‘aim’ for all industrialized 
country signatories.  
 The EU's CO2 stabilization goal has been repeatedly reaffirmed, most 
importantly with the EU Council's Monitoring Decision—a legal 
instrument in terms of EU law—that contains a preamble highlighting 
repeated reaffirmations of the goal (see below). Also, both the process 
 
and outcome of developing the Convention have added greatly to the 
status and importance of the EU's commitment. To renege upon it now 
would undermine the UN Convention in the very area in which the EU 
fought hardest for stronger wording, and would be used by 
developing countries as a prima facie reason why they should not take 
significant action. Given that the target has already been reaffirmed by 
the Union's Council of Ministers, it would also make the EU look 
foolish, if not actually devious. Accordingly, there are now strong 
pressures to ensure that the EU stabilization goal is not abandoned, 
and to find ways of achieving it. 
 Stabilization by the EU is not the same thing as stabilization by all 
individual states, since the former allows emissions by some countries 
to increase if others reduce accordingly. The less-developed Cohesion 
countries—notably Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland, which start 
from a base of per-capita emissions far below the EU average—made it 
plain that they would not stabilize their own emissions. They signed the 
Convention on the same basis, drawing on the provision for joint 
implementation of the stabilization goal—namely, their participation in 
the EU goal—as their commitment. The Council Declarations, and the 
Monitoring Decision, clearly recognize that these countries are likely to 
increase emissions—and by implication that others in the EU must 
reduce correspondingly to achieve the collective goal.  
 To meet the legal requirements of the Convention, a full EU report, 
detailing strategy in place to achieve stabilization, should be lodged 
with the Secretariat by 21 September 1994. The difficulties in preparing 
this—which at the time of writing seem unlikely to be resolved in time to 
meet the deadline—reflect the fundamental dilemmas and unresolved 
tensions in EU climate policy.  
 
 
EU CO2 Emissions Stabilization: National Composition 
The EU's stabilization goal was not a random choice. Nor did it reflect 
simply a recognition that such 1990–2000 stabilization was fast 
becoming a standard symbolic and psychological demonstration to the 
developing world that developed countries could, and intended to, 
start addressing the problem by at least ensuring that their CO2 
emissions did not continue to rise. It was also a reflection that the 
targets already declared by member countries, if achieved, would be 
almost sufficient to achieve 1990–2000 stabilization across the EU. This 
is indicated in Table 1, which shows various measures of 1990 
emissions by member countries, and the declared national emission 
targets. Set against these are the emissions projected in the absence of 
any abatement measures for the Reference Scenario calculated by the 
European Commission's Energy Directorate.5 
 The table illustrates several points about the EU situation
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EU Monitoring Decision (passed by Council of 
Ministers, March 1993)  
 
Whereas on the signing of the Convention the Community and its 
Member States reaffirmed the objective of stabilization of CO2 
emissions by 2000 at 1990 level in the Community as a whole . . . 
 
2.1 The Member States shall devise, publish, and implement 
national programmes for limiting their anthropogenic emissions of 
CO2 in order to contribute (i) to the stabilization of CO2 emissions by 
2000 at 1990 levels in the Community as a whole, assuming that 
other leading countries undertake commitments along similar lines, 
and on the understanding [of burden-sharing giving special 
allowances for poorer EC members] . . . (ii) the fulfilment of the 
commitment . . . in the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.  
 
2.2 Each Member State shall . . . include . . . details of national policies 
and measures . . . and trajectories for its national CO2 emissions . . . to 
2000.  
 
5.3 The Commission shall evaluate the national programmes, in 
order to assess whether progress in the Community as a whole is 
sufficient to ensure fulfilment of the commitments . . . 
 
5.4 The Commission shall report to the Council and the European 
Parliament the results of its evaluation within six months of the 
reception of the national programme  
 
6. After the first evaluation . . . , the Commission shall annually 
assess in consultation with the Member States whether progress in 
the Community as a whole is sufficient to ensure that the 
Community is on trajectory to fulfil the commitments . . .  
 
 
Total emissions are dominated by Germany and the United Kingdom, 
and then Italy and France. There are wide differences in the starting per-
capita emissions, with those from Germany and the United Kingdom 
being about twice the level in Spain, with Portugal even lower. This 
reflects different patterns of economic development, but also other 
factors like climate and energy-supply mix, as indicated by the relatively 
low per-capita level of France and Italy. 
 The reference projections indicated that CO2 emissions, excluding the 
former East German territory (‘old-EC’), were expected to rise about 13 
per cent above 1990 levels by 2000 in the absence of abatement 
measures. The Commission acknowledged considerable uncertainty in 
such projections—and outlined also a ‘higher growth’ scenario in 
which emissions by the year 2000 from the big four (Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Italy, and France) are 3–5 per-cent higher than in the 
reference case.6 
 
The Five-Part Strategy  
The year 1990, with the completion of the Maastricht Treaty and 
confident movement towards the ‘1992’ Single European Market, was 
the year of peak optimism about European integration. In the climate 
discussions, the European Council decided very early on that an 
arrangement of explicit burden-sharing through national emission 
targets was not appropriate for a converging Community, and the 
European Commission was, in 1990, asked by member governments to 
prepare an EC-wide strategy for turning the projections of 12–14 per-
cent emissions increase into a collective stabilization. Extended 
discussions, and to some extent commandeering of existing EC 
programmes for addressing Europe's energy needs, led to a five-part 
strategy being advanced by the Commission, backed up by a series of 
analyses and discussion documents:7 
 
· direct measures to improve energy efficiency through implementation 
of the existing SAVE proposals (Specific Actions for Vigorous 
Energy Efficiency) for a series of Directives on energy efficiency stan-
dards. It was estimated that these would reduce EC CO2 emissions in 
2000 by 3 per cent below the reference projection;  
· strengthening of existing measures for promoting the dissemination 
of better energy conversion and use technologies, primarily through 
new phases in the EC's THERMIE programme. These were estimated 
to save another 1.5 per cent of projected CO2 emissions. The JOULE 
programme for energy RD&D would also encourage development of 
better technologies primarily for longer-term reductions; 
· a programme of support for renewable energy technologies, which 
emerged as the ALTENER Directive which set goals for the contribu-
tion of renewable energy. This would have most impact after the year 
2000, but was projected to reduce emissions by another 1 per cent by 
that year; 
· a combined energy/carbon tax, to be introduced at a level of three 
dollars per barrel of oil equivalent (US$3/boe) in 1993, rising by 
US$1/boe annually to a level of US$10/boe in 2000.8 The reduction in 
year 2000 emissions would be ‘between slightly more than 3% and 
some 5.5% of the 1990 level according to the policy stance on 
industry exemptions and the way of taxing electricity’; and 
· additional measures taken by Member States, which would
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Table 1. EU CO2 emissions: 1990 levels and projections for 2000 
Country C02 reduction target (%) 1990 emissions  Projected emissions to the year 2000 
  (Million tonnes of CO2) (Million tonnes of CO2) 
          
  % EU Per capita Total CEC reference* National targets 
 
Belgium -5 (2000,1990)   4.0 11.2    112*    121.7    106 
Denmark -20 (2005,1988)   1.8   9.9      51*      65.5      48** 
France stabilization at 2tC/cap 13.2   6.5    366*    431.4    425 
Germany (West) -25 (2005,1987) 25.5 11.3    709    800.6    674** 
Greece +25 (2000,1990)   2.7   7.4      74*      96.6      92 
Italy  0 (2000,1990) 14.4   6.9    400    464.0    400 
Ireland +20 (2000,1990)   1.1   8.8      31      36.0      37 
Luxembourg 0 (2000,1990)   0.5 35.1      13*      13.7      13 
Netherlands -3 to -5 (2000,1989)   6.6 12.2    182    178.1    177 
Portugal +29 to 39 (2000,1990)   1.4   4.1      40      57.0      55 
Spain +25 (2000,1990)   7.6   5.4     211*    259.8    263 
United Kingdom 0 (2000,1990) 21.1 10.2    587    614.1    587 
 
EU12 0 (2000,1990)   2,776 3,138.5 2,877 
% increase relative to 1990          13.1        3.6 
 
Germany (East)  10.7 18.3    298    236.8    n.a. 
Notes:*Data from Commission of the European Communities, ‘A View to the Future’, Energy in Europe, special issue (Sept. 1992), CEC-
DGXVII, Brussels. Otherwise data are taken from national plans or statements.  
**In figures for countries which have a year-2005 target, 20% reductions are estimated as a 5% reduction achieved by the year 2000, 
because many measures can contribute substantially only after 2000. 
 
report their national strategies to the Commission, which would then 
be empowered to monitor and review them, and if progress towards 
the target were inadequate, propose new measures. 
 
Full implementation of the Community-wide measures would thus 
reduce projected emissions by 8.5–11 per cent, leaving a rather small 
gap to be filled by additional Member-State initiatives under the 
‘monitoring’ proposals. 
 It was originally intended by the Commission (and indeed 
governments) that this package of measures would be agreed by the 
European Council of Ministers before the Rio ‘Earth Summit’ 
Conference. However, agreement of a draft directive on the 
carbon/energy tax by the Commission proved to be very difficult. 
Concerns about the impact of the tax on industrial competitiveness led 
to substantial exemptions for energy-intensive industries, and it was 
decided (due partly to electricity trade complications) that the tax should 
apply to electricity output rather than input fuels; both weaken the 
impact on emissions, limiting the likely emission reductions to little more 
than 3 per cent of the reference projection by 2000. In a further crucial 
change, the tax proposals were also made9 ‘conditional on the 
introduction by other member countries of the OECD of a similar tax or 
of measures having an financial impact equivalent to the measures 
provided for in this Directive’. 
 The failure of other OECD countries to implement such fiscal 
 
measures has been part of the justification for those opposed to the EU 
tax proposals, but the opposition lies deeper. In presenting its March 
1993 budget the UK government signalled fundamental opposition, in 
declaring that it would not accept taxes ‘imposed by Brussels’ and 
announcing a very different package involving VAT on domestic 
energy, and steadily rising vehicle-fuel excise duties. Indeed, by the time 
the Commission presented its five-part package, the winds of 
Unification had turned 180 degrees to re-emphasize the role of national-
level policy-making (subsidiarity), and there was a general decline in the 
priority accorded to environmental concerns as Europe sank into 
recession. Climate policy was one of the earliest victims of these 
changes. Of the Commission's five-part strategy:10 
 
· the tax proposal is essentially dead for the present. Neither the 
Cohesion countries nor the United Kingdom show any willingness 
to accept a harmonized energy/carbon tax, and it now seems clear 
that Denmark is the only EU country prepared to push ahead with 
one on its own;  
· the SAVE programme of energy efficiency standards has been 
largely sacrificed on the altar of subsidiarity, with an understanding 
that member states are free to pick and choose measures, subject to 
EU competition law; 
· the THERMIE programme for promoting energy-efficient 
technologies through demonstration and enhanced diffusion 
schemes can only make a marginal contribution; 
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· the ALTENER programme for promoting renewable energy 
technologies likewise can have little impact by 2000, because of 
inherent timing constraints and lack of funding; 
· the result is to place nearly all the weight upon the fifth component of 
the strategy, namely the ‘monitoring mechanism’ by which Member 
Countries develop and submit to the Commission their own national 
strategies for abatement—which presumably have to subsume the 
original SAVE proposals and considerably more.11 
 
The central place now given to national strategies is reflected in the fact 
that the Monitoring Decision is the only substantive piece of Union 
legislation yet to have passed through Council. As indicated in the box, 
it establishes a legal and institutional basis for working towards CO2 
stabilization in the Union. The problem is that the national programmes 
submitted under this do not convincingly add up to EU stabilization. 
 
EU Emissions Outlook 
With the exception of the United Kingdom moving its target date for 
returning emissions to 1990 levels forward from 2005 to 2000, little has 
changed in the emission commitments by Member States since 1990. 
The national targets set would keep old-EC emissions growth to 3.6 per 
cent above 1990 levels, with nearly all the difference (compared with the 
CEC reference scenario) coming from abatement in Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, and Denmark;12 Spanish emissions would 
increase to nearly 10 per cent of the total.13 However, if the collapse in 
CO2 emissions from the former East Germany projected by the 
Commission does materialize and is incorporated, and the rest of 
Germany were to achieve the separate reductions illustrated in Table 1, 
this brings the total to within a per cent or two of stabilization. Therefore, 
there are hopes that the problem of projecting 1990–2000 stabilization 
will solve itself.  
 But there are three problems with this neat solution. First, the 
ambiguity of the centrally important German position, arising both from 
the fact of Unification during the 1990 base year, and the fact that a 
German goal or projection for 2000 has never been presented—at the 
time of writing, Germany thus remains in breach of its legal obligation 
under the Monitoring Decision. Secondly, even if one took the plans at 
face value, a per cent or two more reduction across Europe needs either 
most countries to agree to a bit more than current goals (which are 
mostly simple national stabilization), or one or two countries to do much 
more—and neither is politically simple.  
 Thirdly—and most importantly—some of the national plans and the 
associated emission goals frankly look implausible. The first round of 
national plans are of very variable quality and some are little more than a 
combination of ‘business as usual’ projections with a list of technical 
options for emissions limitation. This is essentially the experience that 
the Commission had already gone through by 1990. As experience 
shows, the central issues are to do with policy and implementation. 
Also, projections tend to swing with the economic mood: the recession 
induced hopes that the goal would achieve itself, but the gradual 
emergence from recession during 1994 is lowering the perceived 
credibility of such projections.  
 
Ways Forward  
The EU Report to the Conference of Parties 
The most immediate dilemma facing the Commission at the time of 
writing is what to report to the Conference of Parties. The discussion 
above indicates the fragility of emission projections. Given the gift of 
East German reductions, Europe is within striking distance of 1990–2000 
stabilization, and the blunt fact is that it could choose the projection that 
best suits its interests. 
 But it is unclear where those interests lie. For the Commission to 
question, in an official report to a UN body, the veracity or reliability of 
reports and projections submitted by Member States, is at best 
politically tricky; and to state that Europe will not meet the target that it 
has so often berated others for not formally adopting is scarcely 
feasible. Blind acceptance of the national projections, coupled with 
judicious choice of emissions base-line definitions (for example, in the 
treatment of emissions from East Germany and accession countries), 
and/or slight modification of some national targets, could allow Europe 
to present a picture of being on track. For the Member Countries this 
would be most appealing.  
 But for the Commission, the resulting implication that nothing needs 
to be done at Community level would not be so attractive. Perhaps the 
most likely outcome, therefore, is to admit uncertainty: if all Member 
States deliver their promised projections, Europe might reach its goal, 
but this still depends upon policies yet to be delivered and uncertain 
projections. Consequently there is likely to be a need to revisit, and 
fundamentally reconsider, Community-wide policies to limit CO2 
emissions—a conclusion which is somewhat embarrassing to admit 
globally, but which would suit the Commission perfectly well and is 
probably the most honest assessment. 
 
The Policy Dilemma 
This outcome would bring the Community almost full circle 
to the situation in November 1990, and serve to emphasize 
that whilst the EU's commitment to stabilization is an 
important step, the real difficulties, as so often in 
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environmental policy, lie in the implementation. There needs to be a 
fresh look at the problems, and recognition of the special difficulties 
involved in addressing a pervasive and crucial sector like energy, in the 
complex and evolving political make-up of the EU. 
 What are the fundamental dilemmas? Brute politics aside, they lie in 
the fact that the policies required to implement emission constraints 
logically involve action at a variety of levels, combined with a lack of real 
incentives on the part of member states to contribute to the collective 
goal. For some of the relevant measures, such as efficiency standards 
on tradeable goods, there clearly is a strong case for harmonizing action 
across the EU. There are sound reasons also for seeking to harmonize 
fiscal measures, though variations in existing tax structures and political 
attitudes create genuine difficulties and these, combined with the fact 
that tax issues require unanimity, have so far proved powerful 
obstacles. Yet, having other measures established at the Union level 
makes little sense: building-insulation standards are very relevant, for 
example, but no one trades buildings, and even if they did they would 
hardly want the same standards in Portugal as in Denmark. Indeed, all 
kinds of issues—the form of utility regulation, VAT distortions, 
transport policy, and so on—affect CO2 emissions, and it is clearly not 
realistic to suppose that all of these can or should be co-ordinated 
across the EU as part of the stabilization policy. 
 This, combined with the broader political and cultural differences 
between Member States, makes it clear that the key energy-policy 
decisions required to stabilize emissions cannot and should not all be 
taken centrally. Yet the goal remains inherently a collective one. 
 
National Emission Targets 
An opposite approach to that of centralized development of energy 
policies for limiting CO2 is simply to negotiate CO2 emission targets for 
each Member State, such that the total adds up to the stabilization goal. 
In form, this would be just like the Large Combustion Plant Directive for 
limiting sulphur dioxide emissions. This has the political advantage of 
being a very simple and well-understood approach, which leaves the 
specific energy-policy decisions required to meet the emission targets 
to the Member States.  
 In one sense, the existence of national targets already declared means 
that Europe is already some way down this road. But there are several 
problems with relying on these national targets, backed up by the 
Monitoring Directive. Most importantly, it is far from clear how 
seriously some governments will ensure that their targets are met, 
because there is no direct incentive—other than political face-saving—
for ensuring this. The Commission, through the Monitoring Directive, 
can sound the alert when national policies are not adequate to meet the 
declared emission goals—and it has done so. But what steps are then 
open? 
 Attempting to convert existing national targets into legal 
commitments, through a directive analogous to the Large Combustion 
Plant Directive for SO2, faces a number of problems. These arise 
principally because CO2 is a much more fundamental issue with 
potentially higher costs and much less scope for closely targeted 
reductions in emissions by installation of clean-up equipment.  
 Thus in the context of CO2, the approach of setting fixed national 
targets is not flexible, because the process of setting such targets is so 
fraught and difficult politically that the prospects for revising the 
distribution of emissions between countries, if this proves justified in 
the light of national trends and experience, is negligible. This same 
factor creates a very powerful incentive on all the negotiating parties to 
ensure that they get the highest-possible emission target, with 
maximum headroom for uncertainty in emissions.  
 Nor is such a system efficient, because the targets might require more 
difficult or high-cost measures in one country whilst simpler abatement 
opportunities elsewhere remain unexploited; an argument that has 
already been used to oppose such a system. Also, an agreement on 
fixed and binding emission targets would give no incentive upon 
countries to do better than their negotiated target. If some breached 
their target, then—quite apart from the question of what sanctions 
might be invoked—it is most unlikely that other countries would seek 
to exceed theirs sufficiently to enable the EU goal to be met. On the 
contrary, it now seems likely that certain EU countries could readily 
‘over-achieve’ their target, and at present they have an incentive to 
defer abatement policies so as to leave themselves with a high base for 
subsequent negotiations. On such a system, the EU would lose most 
of the potential benefits of being a union. In the aftermath of the 
October 1990 declaration, the approach was cursorily examined and 
politically rejected. 
 
Tradable Emission Quotas: Principles  
A way out of this dilemma could be to negotiate initial national emission 
‘quotas’, but with the critical distinction that the Member States, or their 
industries, would be free to ‘trade’ them with others. In other words, the 
Union could create ‘emission quotas’ for carbon totalling the already 
agreed level (i.e. stabilization in 2000 at the 1990 level) and negotiate an 
initial division, but these would not form fixed targets. Participants 
would undertake to ensure that their emissions in the target year (2000) 
do not exceed the quotas they hold in that year. If their initially agreed 
quota allocation proves insufficient, they would have to obtain, from 
other Member States, additional quotas. Thus, some countries 
could let their emissions exceed their initial allocation if 
 they obtain quotas from others whose abatement efforts 
 leave them with spare—and who would thus be rewarded 
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accordingly. 
 In essence this would create an internal EU ‘market’ in entitlements to 
emit CO2, and harness market incentives for the purpose of achieving 
the stabilization goal. There would be a direct incentive on all countries 
to minimize emissions (either to minimize the payment for quotas or to 
maximize the revenue from selling them) irrespective of whether they 
were meeting some pre-defined national target. National 
bureaucracies—and in particular finance ministries—would be faced 
directly with the fact that CO2 emissions involve a tangible cost, and 
could thus balance internally the benefits of constraint against more-
traditional energy policy goals. Ultimately, the ‘price’ of such quotas 
should settle at a point which reflects the least costly way of meeting 
the stabilization target anywhere in the Union. The efficiency benefits 
could be considerable; one study suggests that the costs of an 
approach which allows such inter-country flexibility could be just one-
fiftieth of the costs involved if each country were bound to stabilizing 
CO2 emissions individually.14 
 Such a system ensures that the collective goal of stabilizing total 
emissions is attained, because this is established by the total number of 
quotas issued. But it is much more flexible than the allocation of fixed 
targets. It is also fully consistent with the ‘polluter pays’ principle by 
ensuring that increases in emissions above the agreed initial quotas are 
paid for, and additional constraint is rewarded.  
 Governments would retain control over the policies used to limit 
emissions, but components could be adjusted for mutual benefit under 
the broad thrust of overall EU harmonization. The Commission could 
still promote Europe-wide components to energy and climate policy; 
indeed, governments might be more receptive to them because the 
benefit of limiting emissions would be more tangible. Energy pricing is 
important, and reform of tax systems to place greater weight on 
energy/carbon taxation over time is an important strategic component 
of climate policy; such measures could and should continue to be 
promoted in concert with a tradable quota system. But many other 
measures would be relevant, and a harmonized tax agreement across 
the EU would not be the focus of success or failure to achieve the 
stabilization goal. 
 The approach would thus provide an efficient and feasible way of 
meeting the declared goal, whilst being consistent with two major 
policy principles enunciated by the EU and agreed by the Member 
States: the subsidiarity principle, by devolving the detailed energy 
policy decision-making as far as is consistent with Union objectives; 
and the polluter-pays principle.  
 
Tradable Emission Quotas: Practicalities 
Obviously, setting up such a system would be complex and would 
require both analysis and negotiations to address a range of complex 
 
questions concerning allocation, management, and practical operation 
of such a system, as compared with the alternatives. Many of these are 
considered elsewhere, in a more detailed study conducted between a 
number of European institutes.15  
 Negotiating the initial allocation of quotas would inevitably be a 
politically fraught and difficult process, though as experience to date 
reveals it is not unique in facing the problem of negotiating ‘burden 
sharing’, which ultimately has to be faced in any substantive EU effort. 
As compared with fixed targets, the difficulties might be eased by the 
added flexibility: countries would no longer have to err on the side of 
extreme caution because of uncertainties about being able to meet 
particular emission targets. It could also offer a politically feasible way 
out from existing declarations about the unacceptability of particular 
targets.  
 Although this is introduced in the context of the 1990–2000 
stabilization goal, in practice it makes most sense if developed as an 
instrument for emissions control over a longer period. This recognition 
could also ease the initial development of the system. Countries would 
negotiate in the knowledge that the goal of 1990–2000 stabilization is 
likely to be but the first step, and that if a tradable quota system is 
established as an effective and efficient mechanism, there are likely to be 
further rounds of allocation. A country which ends up with a large 
surplus of quotas in the year 2000 would be pressured to a lower 
allocation in subsequent rounds; and if the situation arises because it 
held out for an unreasonably high allocation, based on implausibly 
high projections of CO2 emissions, the credibility of its negotiation 
position for subsequent rounds would be seriously weakened.  
 Furthermore, this opens the possibility of ‘banking’ quotas for future 
use. In other words, if, under the incentive of the system, it proves 
possible to do better than the stabilization goal, and the price of quotas 
drops correspondingly to low levels, parties with spare quotas could 
elect to ‘bank’ them for later use—or for selling in the future—based on 
their expectation of how much emission constraints may tighten after 
2000. This both improves the stability of the system and improves the 
prospects for exceeding and strengthening the environmental goal. 
The importance of allowing such banking has been clearly 
demonstrated in US experience with tradable permits. 
 The benefits of designing a system which can, if necessary, be 
extended over time raises a number of other possible design issues. 
Grubb and Sebenius16 develop a proposal for a system of permits with 
extended lifetimes, of which a fraction are retired every few years and 
reissued according to the need to tighten the emissions control and/or 
expand the range of participants.  
 It is this possibility which points to the real importance of finding 
a workable and flexible solution to the EU's climate 
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dilemmas. It must, anyway, be an approach that can cope with 
expansion of the Union. Implicitly, it could also form the practical basis 
for an expanding regime of climate control, that could enlarge to include 
non-member states: OECD countries like Japan that may only be able to 
meet their commitments as part of a larger group; and perhaps beyond 
that, developing countries who see it as an effective and practical 
means of developing a global regime with mutual benefits. This 
possibility brings us back to the starting-point of this article: if the EU 
system can find a way of implementing its emissions commitment in an 
effective and efficient manner, its greatest value may be as a 
demonstration and nucleus for a global solution.  
 As indicated, there are many practical and political issues that would 
need to be resolved. But what is needed at present is political 
recognition that such an approach could offer an effective way forward 
for implementing the European Union's CO2 commitment, and a 
commitment to open high-level discussions on the possible design of 
such a system as part of the EU strategy.  
 
Conclusions and Prospects 
Climate change remains as a real concern. The institutional regimes 
established globally and within the EU during the past three years 
partially insulate government policy from the ebb and flow of popular 
concern, and generate internal pressures which force governments to 
keep addressing the issue and reviewing whether progress is adequate. 
These developments have strongly reinforced the original EU 
undertaking to stabilize CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000, 
and the Monitoring Decision forms the legal and institutional basis for 
achieving this. But the national programmes are not all convincing; nor 
do they fully achieve the declared goal, which is but the beginning of 
likely longer-term needs. With the effective collapse of the 
carbon/energy tax and drastic weakening of the SAVE programme, 
Europe does not have a strategy to achieve its CO2 undertaking.  
 The first meeting of the UN Conference of Parties will be held in 
Germany, and the submission of the European strategy has to be made 
during the course of the German presidency. At present, unless there 
are very rapid developments, Germany and the EU face a politically and 
environmentally damaging failure. The roots of this failure would lie in 
the same elements that underlie the global endeavour: how to 
implement collective commitments among diverse and jealously 
sovereign states in an area as fundamental as energy policy. 
 Yet there are substantial pressures to find some convincing strategy. 
If there is substantive political will, perhaps during the period of the 
sequential German–French–Spanish presidencies, then political realities 
may force Member States to launch negotiations on binding targets or, 
more promisingly, tradable national-emission quotas—to ensure the 
1990–2000 goal, and/or for implementing longer-term emission 
constraints. At present the omens are not promising; but if Europe can 
successfully develop an effective system for collective control of its 
emissions, it may yet fulfil its claim to lead the world in combating the 
threat of climate change.  
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